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The word ‘ commorientes ’ refers to the situation where two (or more) persons die in circumstances 
where it is uncertain which of them died last. Where there is uncertainty as to who was the 
last survivor, the effect of current English law is to prescribe artifi cially the sequence among 
consecutive deaths. Section 184 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides a presumed order 
of succession based on seniority when the deaths have arisen in circumstances which render 
it uncertain which of two (or more) people survived the other(s). The presumption applies in 
cases of both testate and intestate 1 deaths and in respect of property held on a joint tenancy 2 
where there is an automatic right of survivorship between the co-owners so that the last 
survivor of two (or more) tenants will become the sole owner of the property. The sequence 
of deaths is, therefore, particularly signifi cant in determining the question of devolution where 
property is held on a joint tenancy. 
The pre-1926 position 
Before 1926, there was no statutory presumption as to the order of deaths or of simultaneous 
death where it was unclear which had survived the others. This meant that the onus was on 
the claimant to prove his case – if his claim depended on showing that A survived B, then the 
claimant had to establish that fact affi rmatively or lose his claim. 3 If two deceased had mutual 
claims to succeed to each other ’ s respective estates and there was no evidence as to who died 
fi rst, the court adopted the legal fi ction that they died at the same time. 4 
In the absence, therefore, of any statutory presumption of survivorship based on age or 
sex, the only way in which the respective estates of A and B could be administered was to 
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conclude that none survived the other so that neither could take any interest under the will 
of the other. 5 Moreover, if the deceased were joint tenants, their estate remained in a joint 
tenancy in their respective heirs. 6 This meant that the normal right of survivorship would 
operate as between the various successors of the deceased, notwithstanding that they might be 
complete strangers to one another. Assume, for example, two joint tenants, A and B who died 
in circumstances where it was impossible to say which had died fi rst. If A left one successor (a 
spouse) and B left nine successors (brothers and sisters), the position at common law was that all 
ten successors would hold the joint property between them upon a joint tenancy. If A ’ s spouse 
then decided to sever the joint tenancy, she would become entitled to a 10 per cent share of 
the joint property. Needless to say, the common law response of implying a new joint tenancy 
arrangement between the (potentially) numerous respective successors of the deceased was not 
seen as satisfactory and, therefore, led to the enactment of the statutory presumption currently 
embodied in s 184 of the 1925 Act. The effect of the presumption, in the context of a joint 
tenancy, is to confer sole ownership of the property on the youngest victim and subsequently 
on his (or her) successors alone. 
The interpretation of section 184 
Successive and simultaneous deaths 
The precise scope of s 184 has given rise to much judicial debate, particularly whether it applies 
where: 
(1) the order of death is unknown, but death is not simultaneous; or 
(2) the order of death is unknown, or death is practically simultaneous. 
In Hickman and Others v Peacey, 7 fi ve people (two of whom had made wills benefi tting some of 
the others) were killed by a bomb during an air raid in circumstances where it was impossible to 
say whether any of them had survived the others. By a majority, 8 the House of Lords held that, 
in the absence of evidence as to who died fi rst, the correct conclusion was that they had died in 
circumstances rendering it ‘ uncertain ’ which of them survived the other(s) within the meaning 
of s 184 of the 1925 Act. The upshot was that the younger of the deceased was deemed to have 
survived the older in determining the administration of their respective estates. According to 
Viscount Simon LC, 9 however, who gave a strong dissenting opinion, s 184 had no application 
where (in the very rare case) it could be positively proven that two or more persons died 
absolutely simultaneously. According to his Lordship: 10 
‘ The condition which must be fulfi lled if the presumption is to apply at all is that there 
should be a survival of one person beyond the death of another, but that it should be 
uncertain which was the survivor. ’ 
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18 Ibid , at 323. See also, Lord Porter, at 337: ‘ I am not sure that the occurrence of two deaths at 
exactly the same point 
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theoretical questions of this kind, I think the section itself is so framed as to exclude the possibility of 
simultaneous death 
from ever being recognised as a certainty and to include it amongst the uncertainties. ’ 
This, therefore, did not rule out the possibility of simultaneous deaths: 
‘ a rule of racing which provided that, where the judge was uncertain which of two horses 
passed the winning post fi rst, the younger horse should take the prize, would not prevent 
the sharing of the prize in a dead-heat. ’ 11 
On this reasoning, if the deceased all died at the same time, there would be no uncertainty 
in relation to the order of their deaths and, hence, the distribution of their estates would not 
be governed by any statutory presumption of seniority. The problem, however, is determining 
whether it is actually possible for two or more deaths to coincide precisely in time. Although, in 
one sense, time is ‘ infi nitely divisible ’ , the possibility of simultaneous deaths, as a matter of law, 
has not been ruled out. 12 Although expressed by Viscount Simon LC as being ‘ very unusual ’ , 13 
it did not, in his view, seem impossible for two people to die at the same time. 14 In any case, it 
would ultimately fall to the claimant to prove (as a pure question of fact) 15 that the deaths were 
simultaneous. Again, His Lordship gave an example: 16 
‘ I recoil from the proposition that two soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder in the same 
trench when a high explosive shell drops between them and blows them to smithereens, 
cannot rightly be held by a court of law to be proved to die at exactly the same moment. ’ 
This interpretation of s 184 is also echoed in the speech of Lord Wright 17 (also in the dissent) 
who recognised that the section introduced a ‘ new and very arbitrary presumption ’ to operate 
only in the case of the specifi c uncertainty where it is unclear from the facts which of two or 
more persons survived the other. Where there is no such uncertainty (because all the persons 
have died at the same time), the section, in his view, was irrelevant. 
This approach, however, was not accepted by the majority. Lord Macmillan ‘ gravely 
doubted ’ 18 whether s 184 contemplated as a practical consideration the possibility of 
simultaneous deaths. If it did, then it was ironic that the statute had failed to meet this eventuality 
by providing an appropriate solution for cases where only persons had died consecutively. In 
the Hickman case, according to his Lordship, there was clearly an element of uncertainty as to 
which of the deceased survived the others, and that was enough to trigger the operation of 
s 184 so as to bring the presumption of seniority into play. This was also the view of Lord Porter 
and Lord Simonds. The latter was mindful of the fact that, if s 184 was construed so as not to 
apply to instantaneous deaths, the legislative purpose in providing a presumptive solution in 
cases of uncertainty would be defeated. In cases where the deceased all died at the same time, 
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the absence of the statutory presumption would require the court to concede that there was a 
lacuna in the drafting of s 184 and, therefore, to administer the deceased estates in accordance 
with the pre-1926 law, namely, on the footing that none could take any interest in the estate 
of the others. Lord Simonds also had diffi culty in accepting that two or more people could die 
simultaneously. Like Viscount Simon LC, his Lordship used the example of a horse race: 19 
‘ A judge, with the limited power of discernment that nature has bestowed on him, may 
decide that two horses have passed the post at the same time. A high-speed camera will 
show that he was wrong and that one horse passed it in front of the other. And if that 
camera appeared to show that they passed at the same time, yet a fi ner instrument would 
show that that too was wrong. ’ 
Given these uncertainties, the inescapable conclusion, in his Lordship ’ s view, was that 
simultaneous death is not possible and that, if survivorship is not proved, the only alternative 
is uncertainty envisaged by s 184. On this interpretation, there is no lacuna in the statute and 
the section can be construed to cover every eventuality where it cannot be proved that one of 
two (or more) persons dying together survived the other(s). The upshot of the majority 20 view 
in Hickman , therefore, is that s 184 falls to be construed broadly so as to include not just cases 
where there is a problem in ascertaining which of two (or more) persons died fi rst (ie where 
the order of death is unknown), but also where the deaths have occurred at the same time 
(ie where the order of death is unknown but death is practically simultaneous). According to 
the majority, therefore, the statutory presumption applies even if the deaths are simultaneous 
because proof of simultaneous death is impossible and, hence, if survivorship is not established, 
the only alternative is uncertainty. 
The diffi culty, however, with this approach, in the writers ’ view, is that the presumption of 
seniority is applied to all cases of uncertainty and, in the context of a joint tenancy, leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that, even where the death of two or more joint tenants is instantaneous, 
the younger will automatically receive the whole of the property by way of survivorship to 
the exclusion of all the other joint tenants. This is the inevitable conclusion, applying the 
majority in Hickman , even in cases where there is certainty that the deaths are simultaneous. If 
the court cannot say for certain which person died fi rst, (because, they all died at exactly the 
same time), the statutory presumption is triggered and the result is devolution by seniority. The 
only alternative, according to the majority, was to accept that s 184 had left an obvious lacuna in 
failing to provide for the eventuality of simultaneous death. The only way of plugging this gap 
(on the facts in Hickman ) was to revert to the old law which required the respective estates to 
be administered on the basis that none survived the other so that none could take any interest 
in the estate of the other – a clearly undesirable result since it meant restoring (somewhat 
paradoxically) the fi ction (under the pre-1926 law) that they all died together at the same time. 
Rebutting the statutory presumption by contrary evidence 
The reluctance of the English courts to accept the possibility of simultaneous deaths is vividly 
illustrated in the case of Re Lindop, Lee-Barber v Reynolds, 21 where the facts were not dissimilar 
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from those in Hickman . A husband and wife were killed in an enemy air raid. Their house was 
struck by a bomb and demolished – their bodies were found on the ground fl oor underneath 
their bedroom. The evidence showed that they both must have been instantly killed by the 
explosion and two witnesses (who found and examined the bodies) expressed the opinion 
that the deaths must have been simultaneous. Despite this evidence, Bennett J held that it 
was impossible to say that both died at precisely the same moment in time and, therefore, the 
statutory presumption under s 184 applied. The consequence of this was that the wife (who was 
younger) was deemed to have survived her husband and, therefore, to inherit under his will. 
Bennett J openly acknowledged that time was infi nitely divisible and strong proof was required 
to establish the fact that two people died at exactly the same time. In his view, evidence to 
prove simultaneous death had to be looked at ‘ closely and critically ’ – the key question being 
not whether the fatal act took place at the same moment, but whether the parties died at exactly 
the same time. Thus, ‘ two birds may be … struck at exactly the same moment by a different 
pellet coming from the same cartridge [but] there may well be a considerable period of time 
between their deaths ’ . 22 
The case of Re Bate (deceased), Chillingworth v Bate 23 shows that the presumption will only 
be excluded if the actual sequence or order of deaths is a ‘ defi ned and warranted conclusion. ’ 24 
Here, a husband and wife were found dead in their kitchen, the cause of their deaths being 
carbon monoxide poisoning. There was no question of simultaneous deaths, the sole inquiry 
being whether the circumstances of their deaths were such as to render it uncertain as to 
which of them died fi rst so as to bring the presumption under s 184 into play. Jenkins J, having 
reviewed all the evidence, concluded that the facts were inconclusive as to who died fi rst and, 
consequently, applying the statutory presumption, the wife (being younger) was presumed to 
have survived her husband. 
Both these cases demonstrate the court ’ s reluctance to depart from the presumption 
of seniority. In both cases, had the presumption been rebutted, the court would have been 
faced with the prospect of concluding that neither husband nor wife had died fi rst so that the 
distribution of their respective estates would have been determined on the footing that they 
had both died at the same time. This, no doubt, would have led to an unsatisfactory result and, 
hence, was avoided by the court. In Re Lindop , the wife (as the younger) survived her husband 
by virtue of the statutory presumption and his residuary estate became her property for a brief 
moment and, therefore, passed under her will either to her mother or her brothers and sisters. 
If both the wife and husband were held to have died at exactly the same time, on the other 
hand, the husband ’ s residuary estate would not have passed by his will in favour of his wife 
but would have devolved to his sister as his sole next of kin. Similarly, the wife ’ s legacy to him 
under her will would have lapsed (in the absence of proof that he survived her) and would 
have passed for the benefi t of his residuary legatee. These set of consequences would, clearly, 
not have been readily anticipated by the parties themselves. In Re Bate , the husband had died 
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leaving a will, whereas the wife ’ s estate devolved under an intestacy. The application of the 
statutory presumption meant that the wife (who was younger) was presumed to have survived 
her husband with the consequence that she inherited under his will and her property then 
passed to those entitled on her intestacy. If, however, the presumption had been displaced, the 
court would have been bound to conclude that none survived the other so that neither would 
have been able to inherit any property from the estate of the other. Again, a conclusion which 
(presumably) would not have been favoured by the parties. 
The standard of proof 
Although the modern English cases, 25 as we have seen, have been reluctant to accept any 
evidence falling short of certainty as rebutting the statutory presumption under s 184, it 
is not entirely beyond the realms of possibility to envisage a case where the deaths are so 
contemporaneous as to warrant an actual fi nding of simultaneity. The diffi culty, however, lies in 
the application of the correct standard of proof. 
Most recently, HH Judge Kramer, in Scarle v Scarle, 26 has ruled that the appropriate standard 
is the civil standard of proof (ie the balance of probabilities). In this case, the husband, 79, and 
the wife, 69, both died of hypothermia. The wife had had limited mobility and the husband 
had been her carer. The husband ’ s daughter was the claimant and the wife ’ s daughter was the 
defendant. The husband was found in the lounge and the wife in the toilet area of their home. 
However, the wife ’ s walking frame was found next to the husband ’ s body. There was evidence 
that the husband had been alive on the fl oor for some time before death. Both were in the early 
stages of decomposition, which appeared to be more advanced in the wife. Expert evidence 
was adduced as to the temperature and environmental conditions in the house because of their 
effect on the rate of decomposition, although it was agreed that decomposition alone was not 
determinative of the time of death. The claimant ’ s expert took the view that there was no 
signifi cant variation in the micro-climate within the house. The defendant ’ s expert disagreed. 
The couple held joint assets (ie joint tenants of their bungalow and bank account) which passed 
by survivorship to the one who died last, and then to the benefi ciaries of the latter ’ s estate. In 
view of the uncertainties regarding the order of death, the presumption in s 184 was held to 
apply so that the wife was presumed to have survived her husband. 
One solution to the diffi culty of proving simultaneous death would be to abandon proof 
by reference to any civil (or criminal standard) altogether and to apply a simple rule that the 
parties would be deemed to die simultaneously unless one survived the other by a specifi ed 
number of hours or days. This is the approach taken in the American Uniform Simultaneous 
Death Act, 27 which provides that, if two or more persons die within 120 hours of one another, 
each is considered to have predeceased the others. The effect of the Act is that their estates 
are divided equally among their next of kin. 28 The 120-hour period is intended to avoid the 
tendency of previous litigation 29 in which the representative of one of the deceased attempted 
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to prove that the one he or she represented survived the other by a fraction of time. The 
Californian case of Re Estate of Meade 30 provides a useful illustration of how the Act operates. 
The husband and wife had died in an airplane crash. There was nothing to suggest that they 
died otherwise than simultaneously. Most of their property was held on a joint tenancy and 
each had died leaving a will. The District Court of Appeal held that one half of the joint 
property of the parties passed under her the husband ’ s will and the other half devolved under 
the wife ’ s will pursuant to the Act. The purpose of the Act was explained 31 as supplanting ‘ the 
former arbitrary and complicated presumptions of survivorship with effective, workable, and 
equitable rules applicable to the ever-increasing number of cases where two or more persons 
have died … simultaneously. ’ 
Property held on a joint tenancy 
The effect of a joint tenancy is, of course, to vest full ownership of the property in the survivor. 
Signifi cantly, the property never becomes part of the estate of the fi rst tenant to die. Under 
s 184, the legal presumption is (as we have seen) that, where there is uncertainty as to which of 
joint tenants survived the other, the older is deemed to have died fi rst. This means, of course, 
that the younger becomes entitled to the whole indivisible estate even though (as a matter of 
pure fact) it is not clear who actually died fi rst. The presumption operates particularly harshly 
since, as we have seen, it has been held to apply even in cases of simultaneous death (ie not only 
where the order of death is unknown but where death is practically instantaneous). If everyone 
in the common disaster is found to have died at the same time, why should the younger be 
afforded the privilege of obtaining the whole estate at the expense of the others ? One rationale 
for this result is the notion that, in the ordinary way of things, the younger is more likely to 
survive in a situation of disaster than the older. It is submitted, however, that the relative ages 
of the parties has become far less signifi cant today given the nature of common disasters which 
now take place in the modern world 32 and the robustness of even much older victims who 
remain active and in good health well beyond their retirement age. 
The proponents of s 184 would, no doubt, argue that the section is inherently artifi cial 
and does not intend to make any judgment about the relative health and strength of the 
deceased persons. Admittedly, the decision to become joint tenants necessarily carries with 
it a deliberate intention to permanently exclude the other party ’ s family or benefi ciaries in 
favour of the surviving joint tenant. However, that decision is made on the assumption that the 
survivor will enjoy the property for a period of time on their own, for example, a surviving 
wife living in the family home after her husband ’ s death. In the case of both joint tenants 
dying together, that presumed intention is clearly frustrated. In these circumstances, it is fair to 
assume that the joint tenants might have wanted to benefi t both sets of next of kin equally. This, 
it is submitted, is a justifi ed assumption because, not knowing who would be the survivor in 
ordinary circumstances, the joint tenants clearly contemplated two different sets of benefi ciaries 
as being both acceptable ultimate successors in title. It is submitted, therefore, that, where there 
is uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of joint or simultaneous death (ie so that it is 
not known who died fi rst), a fairer and more just solution is to convert the joint tenancy into 
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a tenancy in common in equal shares so that each share then forms part of the estate of the 
deceased tenants. 
A statutory presumption of simultaneous death in these circumstances has already been 
recognised in the Republic of Ireland legislation. Section 5 of the Succession Act 1965 provides: 
‘ Where, after the commencement of this Act, two or more persons have died in 
circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other or others, then, 
for the purposes of the distribution of the estate of any of them, they shall all be deemed 
to have died simultaneously. ’ 
The section on its own, however, did little to alter the common law since it meant that the 
parties in a commorientes situation were deemed to have died simultaneously and, therefore, 
neither party could be said to have survived the other. In the context of a joint tenancy, in 
particular, the question remained as to who was the last survivor. Signifi cantly, s 5 of the 1965 Act 
was amended by s 68 of the Republic ’ s Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 to 
resolve this problem by adding two important subsections: 
‘ (2) Where immediately prior to the death of two or more persons they held any 
property as joint tenants and they died, or under subsection (1) were deemed to have 
died, simultaneously, they shall be deemed to have held the property immediately 
prior to their deaths as tenants in common in equal shares. 
(3) Property deemed under subsection (2) to have been held by persons as tenants in 
common shall form part of their respective shares. ’ 
The advantage of this particular form of wording is that the statutory severance of the joint 
tenancy applies not only in circumstances of uncertainty as to the order of death (envisaged 
under s 5(1) of the 1965 Act where the deceased are deemed to have died simultaneously), but 
also to cases where there is no uncertainty because the circumstances show that they did, in 
fact, all die simultaneously. This, of course, avoids the diffi culties inherent in Hickman where, as 
we have seen, the possibility of simultaneous death was not entirely ruled out, at least by the 
minority 33 of their Lordships. 
The importance of linking severance to cases of uncertainty and simultaneous deaths 
has already been recognised in other jurisdictions. In New Zealand, for example, s 3(1) of the 
Simultaneous Deaths Act 1958 deals with ‘ persons who have died in circumstances which give 
rise to a reasonable doubt as to which of them survived the other or others ’ and also ‘ two or 
more persons who have died at the same time. ’ There are similar provisions in several provinces 34 
in Canada. This form of wording, however, does not, of course, discard the possibility of clear 
evidence as to the exact order of deaths, in which case the estates of the deceased would devolve 
without the need to resort to any statutory severance of the joint tenancy in equal shares. 
The wording also does not cover the situation where say, only two of three joint tenants die 
in the common disaster. In these circumstances, it has been argued 35 that no severance should 
occur since the joint tenant who was not involved in the disaster should become the sole owner 
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of the property under the normal rule of survivorship. In other words, statutory severance is 
only triggered if all of the joint tenants die in the common calamity. 
Signifi cantly, the Northern Ireland Law Commission, in its Report on Land Law, 36 
favoured a change in the law whereby commorientes is treated as an event which severs a joint 
tenancy so that the deceased would be treated as holding their jointly owned property as tenants 
in common at the time of their death. The Commission acknowledged that there was ‘ almost 
unanimous support ’ for this proposal and, consequently, s 50(1) of their draft Land Law Reform 
Bill makes provision for severance of a joint tenancy in the cases where the joint tenants died in 
circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other(s). Section 50(2) makes 
clear that shares in property deemed to have been held as tenants in common form part of their 
respective estates. The outcome would, therefore, be that the deceased ’ s respective successors 
would inherit their shares in the joint property. 
Conclusion 
A repeal of s 184 of the 1925 Act in relation to property held on a joint tenancy in favour 
of an automatic severance of the joint tenancy would, it is submitted, have at least two major 
advantages over the current law in England. First, no automatic right of survivorship would 
operate as between the various deceased favouring the youngest estate to the exclusion of 
all others. Secondly, all the respective successors would benefi t equally in the estate thereby 
avoiding the current imbalance under s 184. 
Any new enactment in this area (in place of s 184) should, however, cover the eventuality 
of both uncertainty in the order of death and simultaneous death. Statutory severance would 
not be triggered unless all of the joint tenants die in the same calamity. In cases of uncertainty, 
the burden of proof should be stated to be the civil standard on a balance of probabilities 
in line with the most recent 37 case law. Given also that, under the current law, the statutory 
presumption under s 184 may be excluded by a contrary testamentary provision, this exception 
should be retained in any new provision allowing for severance not to take place if a contrary 
intention is shown in the will of the deceased. 38 Additionally, the presumption of severance 
should be expressly extended to apply to the situation where the deaths all occur within a short 
interval of time. Here, as suggested earlier, the preferred solution in other jurisdictions is to 
regard neither party as having survived the other. Under the American Uniform Simultaneous 
Death Act, as we have seen, the relevant interval is 120 hours, but this may be fi xed at a longer 
or shorter period of time. The benefi ts of minimising costly and acrimonious litigation amongst 
family members seeking to prove that one of the deceased survived the other is, it is submitted, 
a strong policy consideration which favours the solution of automatic severance enabling equal 
distribution of the joint property. 
The potential unfairness of applying the statutory presumption under s 184 is not, however, 
limited to cases of joint tenancies. If both deceased had made wills in favour of each other prior 
to their deaths or died intestate, the effect of s 184 is that the younger is presumed to have 
survived the older and thus become solely entitled to inherit under his (or her) will or intestacy. 
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Conversely, any legacy under the will of the younger in favour of the older lapses and falls into 
the younger person ’ s residuary estate. Say, for example, an older brother and his younger sister 
die intestate in a common disaster where the order of deaths is uncertain. Let us also suppose 
that they both die without parents or issue owning separate property. Here, s 184 continues to 
apply so that the sister would inherit under her brother ’ s intestacy. The brother ’ s estate, on the 
other hand, would not take anything under his sister ’ s intestacy as he is presumed to have died 
fi rst. There is much, therefore, to be said for repealing s 184 altogether and replacing it with a 
statutory provision, along the lines of the American Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, which 
provides for the equal division of the deceased ’ s estates in all cases of testate and intestate deaths 
(as well in respect of property held on a joint tenancy) unless the will of the deceased contains 
language otherwise dealing with the circumstance of simultaneous death. 
